Comparative studies of mass political culture based on surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), typically leap to using aggregate-level statistics for the entire population. No previous analyses of the WVS have examined value differences associated with a common source of cleavage: ethnicity.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Almond and Verba (1965) published their five-nation study, The Civic Culture, social scientists have sought to develop comparable survey data to study mass political attitudes in different societies. Though not the first multicountry survey using comparable questionnaires and sample designs, Almond and Verba's was a landmark study because it showed how survey data could be used to characterize the subjective "political culture" of a nation and address questions about the congruence between patterns of subjective political orientations and political structures.
Of later multicountry surveys, the one that encompasses the largest number of countries is the World Values Survey (WVS) (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997) . The 1990 The -1993 WVS includes data from 43 societies on five continents. 1 The number and diversity of countries permit analysis of the relation between subjective attitudes and broader institutional and economic contexts that were heretofore impossible. The public dissemination of the data also invites other researchers into the discussion and analysis, and it facilitates replication and elaboration of the results.
This article focuses on the measurement of political values, raising both theoretical and technical objections to how survey data like the WVS have been used to characterize political culture. We question whether the most appropriate unit of aggregation for the study of subjective political culture is the country or some other significant unit. In particular, given the close conceptual link between culture and ethnicity (whether measured by ethnic attachment, religion, race, or language) we propose to examine how often differences in political values are linked to ethnic differences. In particular we examine differences by ethnic group in the distribution of democratic values in 43 societies from the 1990-1993 World Values Survey. We find that in the majority of countries from which we are able to discern ethnic characteristics for subpopulations, ethnic differences are statistically significant and are frequently larger than many between-country differences emphasized in the political culture literature.
WHY LOOK AT ETHNICITY IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CULTURE?
Most analyses of political culture have assumed the existence of a national, i.e., society-wide, political culture. To ascribe a political culture to a society implicitly assumes that the members of a society share some common attitudes and values. However, the assumption of common values is often better met by ethnic groups than by the aggregate population of an entire country. Ethnic identifications are a principal alternative to national affiliations (Geertz, 1973; Gurr, 1993) and the most likely source of systematic within-country variation in political culture.
The level of agreement on basic political values by members of different ethnic groups in multiethnic societies may be critical to the functioning of democratic institutions and to the process of democratization in transition countries. While the nature of the relationship between democracy and ethnicity remains unresolved, the idea is widespread that the two bear on one another (e.g., Pye and Verba, 1965; Rustow, 1970; Lijphart, 1977; Gurr, 1993) .
Our initial motivation for this study was curiosity about the legitimacy of the common practice of characterizing the values of ethnically divided societies by a single "country scores" on indicators such as interpersonal trust, civic competence, and achievement motivation. How reasonable is it to base any analysis on country-level scores for the achievement motivation of, say, French-and Englishspeaking Canadians; Flemings and Walloons in Belgium; Estonians and Russians in Estonia; Slovaks and Czechs in Czechoslovakia; Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo in Nigeria; whites, blacks, Coloreds, and Asians in South Africa; or African Americans, whites, and Hispanics in the United States? Calculating a weighted average of the attitudes of groups that differ systematically in political values would be misleading, all the more so when the groups are distinguished by language, race, ethnic selfidentification, or religion.
As we canvassed the scientific literature, we discovered only one published analysis of the WVS that examines within-country ethnic differences (Lipset, 1996) , despite the great attention given to culture and culture change in studies based on the WVS. 2 We thought it curious to read about the "value orientations" of Estonia and Latvia, countries that are well known for their ethnic divisions, not to mention Czechoslovakia, a country that subsequently divided into two countries along ethnoregional lines. At the same time, we found that for several countries in which ethnicity is especially salient to internal politics, such as Brazil and Russia, the WVS data set provides no information about the ethnicity of the respondents. Like Almond and Verba (1965) , we interpret political culture as a subjective mass phenomenon that consists of orientations toward key objects of the political system and toward the individual's role in it. Almond and Verba state that "the political culture of a nation is the particular distribution toward political objects among members of the nation" (1965, p. 13) . However, in The Civic Culture they assume a high degree of sharedness and durability to such orientations. To represent political culture and not just recent or political opinion the core values must be as Inglehart notes (1990, p. 18) , widely shared by individuals within a society and "enduring but not immutable" (see also Jackman and Miller, 1996) .
THE NOTION OF POLITICAL CULTURE
Yet researchers on political culture have often repeated a critical mistake made by earlier researchers on national character and modal personality types who assumed the existence or a widely shared or a unimodal distribution of personality types within a given society (Inkeles and Levinson, 1968) . Use of the term "culture" to describe the particular configuration of survey responses in a cross-sectional survey implies that central tendencies exist and that they are not merely temporary.
OUR ANALYTIC TASK
We reanalyze data collected in the 1990-1993 round of the World Values Survey (WVS). Like many other researchers, we stipulate which values are core values for purposes of scientific study and comparison. We focus on several elements of a democratic political culture. We seek to determine the degree of heterogeneity both within and across countries in subjective civic competence, interest in politics, interpersonal trust, achievement motivation, national pride, and confidence in national political institutions. 3 Societies and ethnic groups differ not only in their values and experiences but also in their socioeconomic composition. Furthermore, because many of the WVS samples are unrepresentative of the populations from which they are drawn, it is appropriate when comparing the aggregate value distributions for ethnic groups across countries to consider standardizing the samples. We do this by adjusting the individual-level measures of values by regression analysis to derive expected levels on each attitudinal dimension given the individual's age, education, and sex. We then calculate difference scores from the residuals at the individual level: the differences between the observed and expected level of civic competence, interpersonal trust, and so forth, given the individual's age, sex, and level of education. We regard these difference scores as reflecting more enduring value differences in that they are not readily explained away by the age, education or sex composition of the aggregates.
DATA DETERMINING THE ETHNICITY OF WORLD VALUES SURVEY RESPONDENTS
Study after study has used the WVS data by treating the societies as if they were ethnically homogeneous or as if the ethnic heterogeneity were not relevant to an understanding of the value preferences or the political culture of the people. However, information on the ethnic characteristics of the respondents was gathered in many WVS surveys. If we count as "ethnic" any of several variables in the WVS data sets --ethnicity/race (V350), racial/ethnic background (V369), religious denomination (V144, V145), language of interview (V373), and in some cases region (V370) --then it is possible to obtain information on ethnic/racial characteristics of individual respondents for 16 countries.
For some countries, we are able to devise only imperfect surrogates for ethnicity. For Belgium, we use a hybrid variable that corresponds to the evident way in which the sample was stratified: Flanders, Wallonia, and "German speakers." This division closely approximates a division on linguistic grounds and corresponds with the major ethnic cleavages in Belgium (Roessingh, 1996) .
For Nigeria, we use the responses from two variables to reconstruct the ethnicity of the respondent as either Ibo, Hausa-Fulani, or Yoruba. We had information on which of 15 cities the respondents were from and how they identified themselves, as Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa, or "Nigerian first." The responses to these questions were cross tabulated to allow us to identify cities as primarily Ibo, Yoruba, or Hausa. Using this method of classification, Hausa are underrepresented in the sample as a proportion of the total Nigerian population. The sample focused largely on urban areas of Nigeria, while the Hausa are concentrated in the less-urbanized northern states of the country. In any case, our classification by ethnicity is only approximate because of our reliance on region as a surrogate. 4 India is a complicated case because in principle we could use language (interviews were conducted in eight languages), state, or religion as an "ethnic" variable. We choose religion in our analysis --Hindu vs. Moslem --in part because the regional sample design left out the Punjab, Jammu, and Kashmir, some of the regions with the strongest separate identities.
For Bulgaria, we use information from the survey to distinguish Bulgarians from Turks and Gypsies. 5 These are the three largest ethnic groups in Bulgaria (Roessingh, 1996:70) .
Although for China we could have used the 61 respondents from Xinjiang as representing a "minority region," the sample for China is overwhelmingly urban, so it is likely that a disproportionate share of the respondents from Xinjiang were Han rather than Uighurs or Kazakhs, the two largest nonHan nationalities in the region (Anderson and Silver, 1995) . In Romania, we could have isolated Transylvania as a region with a substantial number of Hungarians; but, at least according to Romanian census statistics, only about 20% of the population of Transylvania is Hungarian. 6 Table 1 lists the number of respondents for each derived subnational group in the WVS sample for the 16 countries and 44 ethnic groups.
[ Table 1 about here] 4 In Nigeria, we could have used Christian-Moslem as a criterion instead of the regional surrogate (combined with the selfidentified ethnicity). While this would have helped to distinguish the Moslem Hausa-Fulani from Christian Ibo and Yoruba, it would have missed an obvious line of communal cleavage that was the basis for the Biafran War (which basically separated the Ibo from the others).
WEIGHTS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLES
The codebook distributed by the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) notes that the WVS surveys were conducted by local organizations, often using mainly local resources, who had to deal with a great variety of practical obstacles to developing fully nationally representative samples. Some countries used quota samples; others favored certain regions or the urban population. For example, in Nigeria, China, and India, 90% of the respondents come from the urban population, while in 1994, Nigeria was 38% urban; China, 27%; and India, 27% (World Bank, 1996) .
The WVS researchers developed weights for several countries to compensate for deliberate oversampling of minority populations, such as the oversampling of Asians and whites in South Africa, German speakers in Belgium, French speakers and Italian speakers in Switzerland, blacks in the United States, and certain regions within Nigeria, China, and India. Weights were also calculated for several other countries to compensate for disproportionate sampling by age or education. All of these corrections are likely to improve the representativeness of these samples.
These correctives are not sufficient in some cases. Even when we use weighted data that supposedly correct for oversampling of urban and more highly educated people in several countries, the weighted (corrected) data still reveal implausible figures. We doubt the representativeness of the weighted cases for Nigeria, for example, in which the mean age of the last year of schooling is reported as 18.2 --which is identical to that for Japan, higher than the Netherlands (18.0), Belgium (17.6), Ireland (16.5), Britain (16.3), and Spain (15.8), and almost as high as Canada (18.4) and the United States (18.8). We question whether the Nigerian respondents are even representative of the urban population of that country.
Furthermore, the weight variable (V376) in the WVS data file does more than just correct for internally disproportionate sampling. For many countries, it also incorporates an adjustment to the weighted number of respondents from each country, even when there were no differential weights within countries. For example, in the 1990-1993 WVS the mean weight for the respondents from France was 2.8, although all cases from France were assigned the same weight (the standard deviation of the weights is 0). Consequently, the 1,002 actual respondents from France become 2,806 French respondents in the weighted data analysis. At the same time, the average weight for the respondents from Ireland was .18 (s.d.=0.0), so that the 1,000 actual respondents from Ireland count as 180 in the weighted analysis.
For most of the WVS countries, about 1,000 respondents were interviewed. This is true of China, for example, which has more than 20% of the world's population. The ICPSR codebook notes that weights were applied to the countries to correct for disproportionality between the geographic distribution of WVS respondents and the world population. Yet even after adjustment, the weighted number of Chinese in the sample is about 1,300, or 2% of the weighted WVS respondents --smaller by an order of magnitude than the proportion of Chinese in the world's population. Indeed, the weighted WVS sample has twice as many French respondents as Chinese (2,800 vs. 1,300) and nearly 40% more French respondents than Americans. China, with a population nearly 700 times that of Estonia, has only 1.3 times more WVS respondents in the weighted data. India, with 16% of the world's population, comprises just 4% of the WVS cases. Obviously, then, despite the intention stated in the codebook, the WVS weights far from correct for the imbalance of the cases by region.
We contend that any effort to weight the national samples to reflect the world distribution of the population by country is unnecessary and inappropriate, if only because it would give inordinate weight to a few countries that, however large in population, are not necessarily typical of the experience in different societies. Although the within-country weights improve the representativeness of the respondents from those countries, there is no reason to accept the between-country adjustments in the weight variable in the WVS data set.
Accordingly, we calculated a new weight variable to remove the arbitrary between-country weights while preserving the within-country weights. We did this by dividing V376 by the mean weight for the cases in each country. With our "Newweight," we end up with 1,000 French people in the weighted sample, as well as 1,000 Chinese, 1,008 Estonians, and so forth. But for countries such as China, India, Belgium, South Africa, Switzerland, the United States, and others, in which internally differential weights were incorporated into the original data files, we have preserved differential weights for the individual cases within those countries (to adjust for disproportionate sampling by education, region, and so forth).
If one goal of comparative research is to test for the effects of the country-level context (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) , there is no reason to prefer a sample in which the different countries of the world are represented in proportion to their relative population sizes. A more important goal is to have a sufficient number of randomly chosen respondents from each country so that the means and proportions for the sample are unbiased estimates of the country's population (perhaps after adjustment through country-specific weighting) and so that the variance within each sample reflects the variance in the referent population.
Another goal of the sample design should be to have a sufficient number of cases to permit multivariate analyses at the individual level on important dimensions such as education, age, sex, and ethnicity. Unfortunately, ethnicity was not considered important enough to be used to stratify the samples in most WVS societies. As a result, although we are able to identify the ethnicity of respondents in 16 of the WVS surveys in 1990-1993, the number of minority respondents may be too small for us to test effectively for differences in political values between majority and minority groups. For this reason, our tests for such differences should be regarded as providing conservative estimates of the extent of ethnic differences.
ANALYSIS
For each of the key indicators we ask: How much consensus on the given "democratic attitude" does one find within and between ethnic groups? We are less interested in the mean level for each soci ety than we are in the variance within and between soci eties. We challenge the practice of automatically aggregating micro-level data on subjective orientations to societal or national averages.
Although many fine multicountry studies rely on data from fewer than 43 cases, we think that reducing the WVS data from the 90,000 (or 60,000) cases to 43 needs to be justified. One argument for this might be that some of the variables to be used in the analysis are measured only at the level of whole societies. But this alone does not justify losing so much individual-level information through aggregation. How much individual-level variance is there within countries? How similar are the values of members of different ethnic groups within the WVS societies? Figure 1a reports the percent of the population in each of the 43 societies in the 1990-1993 WVS who stated that "most people can be trusted." The populations of the Nordic countries, China, and Western Europe look the most trusting and that of Brazil the least. Figure 1b presents the responses for the major ethnolinguistic groups within the 16 countries for whom we have ethnic data. Although for some countries there is little difference in the reported scores of subnational groups, for others the differences in the interpersonal trust indicator are quite dramatic, such as in the United States, Nigeria, Canada, and Northern Ireland.
[ Figure 1a and 1b about here
We calculated the means, standard deviations, and coefficients of variation for each of our indicators for each of the 43 WVS societies as well as for the 44 ethnic groups for the 16 countries for which we have an ethnic variable from the WVS data (to save space, the results are not shown in a table). This revealed wide differences within countries, between ethnic groups, and between different indicators. For example, the difference between African Americans (.22) and whites (.54) in the United States on the indicator of interpersonal trust is larger than the difference between the overall U.S. score (.50) and the overall score for South Korea (.34) or Russia (.38).
Let us again examine the measure of interpersonal trust. If we rank just the 44 ethnic groups from the 16 countries on interpersonal trust, we obtain the distribution in Figure 1c . This array of the data looks very different from the original between-country rankings presented in our Figure 1a or from that presented by Inglehart (1997) in his Figure 6 .2. In this view of the world, U.S. African Americans fall into the least trusting third of the ethnic groups for which we have data along with other minority groups such as Poles in Lithuania and Coloreds in South Africa, while U.S. whites are the second most trusting ethnic group and U.S. Hispanics, fifth. Given these differences among American ethnic and racial groups, how trusting should we say that "Americans" are?
[ Figure 1c about here] Similarly, Poles in Lithuania rank 42 nd out of the 44 ethnic groups in their levels of interpersonal trust; Russians in Lithuania rank 27 th ; and Lithuanians rank 17 th (tied with South African whites). Given this disparity, can we speak at all about how trusting the "people of Lithuania" are? We contend that it is misleading at best to characterize the trustingness of "Lithuanians" from a weighted average of the scores for different major ethnic groups in Lithuania. Even if, as in the American case, the largest ethnic group makes up a large majority of the population, wide disparities in values between significant contending and conflicting ethnic groups should not be submerged in aggregate figures for the country.
We find similar relationships when we examine other core values, such as achievement motivation (Figures 2a and 2b --see the Appendix for information on how the scores were derived from the data). The achievement motivation scores range from a low of 1.37 in Chile to a high of 3.21 in Estonia. It is notable that the top nine societies are current or former communist countries. Only Hungary (21 st ) and Poland (37 th ) blemish the apparently outstanding record of the communist system in instilling high achievement motivation in their populations. It is curious, of course, that the communist system, which is reputed to have destroyed incentives for hard work and investment in one's own education, appears to have been even more successful than the United States (tied for 31 st place with Spain) in instilling high achievement motivation. 7
[Figure 2a about here]
In Figure 2b we find several societies that have substantial disparities in achievement motivation scores between ethnic groups: Lithuania (Lithuanians vs. Russians and Poles), Belgium (Flanders vs. Wallonia), Canada (Anglophones vs. Francophones), India (Moslems vs. Hindus), Nigeria (Hausa vs. Yoruba and Ibo), Bulgaria (Bulgarians vs. Turks and Gypsies), and Czechoslovakia (Czechia vs. Slovakia 8 ). In South Africa, differences in achievement motivation between Coloreds and whites or blacks, or between Asians (probably mostly from South Asia) and whites and blacks exceed the between-country difference between South Africa (ranked 39 th among the 43 societies) and Canada (21 st ) or Belgium (16 th ). As Figure 2b shows, a ranking of the world's ethnic groups in achievement motivation differs greatly from a ranking of the mean levels of achievement motivation of the societies in which they live.
[ Figure 2b about here]
Instead of presenting more graphs analogous to those in Figures 1 and 2 for the other value indicators, we summarize in Figure 3 the effects of tests of significance of the differences in the mean value scores for the ethnic groups within the 16 countries for which we have ethnic data. For each value indicator, we test the significance of the mean difference in values between the "majority" or "titular" nationality and the minority nationalities. For the purpose of these comparisons, we treat Hausa as the majority group in Nigeria, Czechs as the majority in Czechoslovakia, and Germans as the majority in Switzerland.
[ Figure 3 about here] Figure 3 shows the percentage of the paired comparisons that are statistically significant at p#.10 (using a two-tailed test) for each of the democratic value dimensions. 9 For the ten value dimensions, the percentage of the paired comparisons that are statistically different ranges between 40% (for confidence in legal institutions) to 71.4% (for pride in country and achievement motivation).
[Figure 3 about here]
Of the 259 paired comparisons for the ten value domains, 61.4% are statistically significant at p#.10 and 51.7% are significant at p#.05. At p#.10, if the relationship between ethnicity and democratic values had been simply random, we would have found only about 26 statistically significant differences. Instead, we find 159. At p#.05, by chance alone we would have found only about 13 statistically significant differences. Instead we find 134.
Thus differences in support for democratic values between ethnic groups within countries are far from just random occurrences. Furthermore, the differences in democratic values between ethnic groups within countries are often much greater than the differences between countries. These findings bolster our contention that scholars who rely on survey data to study political culture ought to pay a lot more attention to ethnic differences within countries than they have in the past. In addition, the ranking of countries on key indicators depends substantially on which ethnic groups within countries are used for comparison, so that the country scores are composites of often very different value priorities for different ethnic groups.
ADJUSTMENTS AROUND A ZERO POINT
The graphs that we have presented highlight the rankings across the WVS societies and ethnic groups but make it difficult to visualize whether, for any given indicator, the society or group is higher or lower than average. To provide such a reference point, it would be easy to calculate and to graph the scores for each society or ethnic group as a difference from the grand mean (the weighted mean for all individuals, or the mean or median value for all societies or ethnic groups).
One objection to such an approach is that, as in the graphs we have shown so far, it still makes no adjustment for the lack of representativeness of the samples. Hence, the observed or reported aggregate score for societies or groups on a given indicator may differ systematically from the actual aggregate scores.
Furthermore, even if the samples from each country were representative, societies and ethnic groups differ in social structure and levels of development. What is the meaning of differences in the aggregate value scores if we are comparing one society or ethnic group that is urban, highly educated, and affluent with another that is rural, undereducated, and poor? Or one society that has an old age structure and another that has a young one?
For purposes of comparing aggregate scores on some indicator of interest, researchers should consider adjusting or controlling for structural differences between and within societies, not only to correct for sampling error but also to adjust for differences in the age, education, or sex composition of the population. In the absence of such adjustments, when researchers compare the values of one group in society that is rural, illiterate, and young (perhaps due to high fertility and low life expectancy) with the values of another group that is urban, highly educated, and older, are they comparing the core and enduring political cultures of the two groups or instead the effects of social structure, fertility and mortality rates, and economic development?
Scholars using the World Values Survey have shown that the typical response or central tendency for a variety of value indicators differs across and within societies, whether the measure is the proportion who think most people can be trusted, the mean level of achievement motivation, or some other indicator. But such comparisons would be more useful if the samples were more representative and if one could control for differences in the age and educational composition of the population.
One approach to adjusting for differences in structural characteristics would be to standardize the national (societal) populations by age and education. Using the WVS data, one could do this by calculating weights that would, in effect, assign to each society the same age-by-education distribution. Another and equivalent approach would be to use regression analysis to estimate the average effects of each of the structural variables (e.g., age, education, gender). That is the method that we adopt here.
We employ OLS regression to estimate an "expected" score on each value indicator as a function of the individual's age, education, and gender. For example, we regress the "pride in country" scores for the approximately 59,000 individuals in the 1990-1993 WVS surveys on the individual's education (age last attended school, expressed as dummy variables for four categories: under 13, 13-16, 17-20, 21+), age (dummy variables for six age groups: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+) , and sex. 10 We use the derived unstandardized regression coefficients to estimate for each individual an "expected pride score" given this individual's education, age, and sex. We then calculate the residual difference between the expected and the observed pride score for each individual. This residual is an estimate of the effects of factors other than the individual's education, age, and gender on the pride in country response. 11 We can aggregate the individual difference scores for each value dimension in a variety of ways. For example, we can calculate the mean difference between the expected and observed pride scores by country or by ethnic group. For the entire set of respondents, the mean difference between the expected and observed pride scores is zero. This is a necessary result of the regression technique. 12 It is also convenient, however, because this zero point represents the grand mean, against which we can compare the observed scores for each individual, group, or society after adjusting for the effects of age, education, and gender. Furthermore, we can now describe the difference between the grand mean and the group-or society-level scores in a standard way across societies as well as indicators, since this difference can be expressed in z-scores or standard-deviation units (using the standard error of the regression estimates). 10 The "omitted" categories in the regression are age 65+, under age 13 when last in school, and female. We include a "male dummy" because we found differences in the sex ratios of the different samples and thought it prudent to adjust for sex differences as long as we were adjusting for education and age. We divide the continuous variables "age last attended school" and "respondent's age" into categories to relax the linearity assumption. The OLS regression equations for each dependent variable include the "main effect" dummy variables for age, education, and sex, as well as interaction effects between the age and education terms. In the case of "interpersonal trust," we use logistic regression because the dependent variable was dichotomous. The OLS equations take the basic form: Y=b0 + b1Age18-24 + b2Age25-34 + b3Age35-44 + b4Age45-54 + b5Age55-64 + b6EdAge13-16 + b7EdAge17-20 + b8EdAge21over +b9Male + multiplicative interaction terms between each age category from "age18-14" through "age45-54" and each education category from "finished at age 13-16" through "finished at Age 21+." This is only one of a variety of possible regression-based approaches to making such adjustments. 11 Other structural variables, such as urban-rural residence, were not available in comparable form for all WVS societies. However, the education variable (and the Age*Education interaction term) probably captures a substantial part of any urbanrural effect.
PRIDE IN COUNTRY AND CONFIDENCE IN MAJOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
We calculated "difference" measures for all of the core democratic values analyzed in this study. To conserve space, we illustrate only a few representative results. Figure 4 shows the results for pride in country ("How proud are you to be [AMERICAN]?").
[Figure 4 about here]
As mentioned above, the mean value of the adjusted scores has been standardized at zero, which makes it easy to see when the value for a given ethnic group is above or below the average for all persons in the WVS as well as to compare ethnic groups within and among countries. The scale on the horizontal dimension is the distance from zero expressed in z-scores or the number of standard deviation units. Thus the mean pride in country score for the respondents from Basque Country is .97 of a standard deviation below the level that would be expected based on their education and age and sex composition. Both the mean and the standard deviation reported in the heading are based on the individual-level data from the 16 societies for which ethnic informa tion can be derived in the WVS.
The respondents from Basque Country show the lowest level of pride in country of any ethnic group in the WVS surveys. Catalonians are also very nega tively disposed toward Spain --not as much as the Basques but definitely less proud than those from "Other Spain" who are (slightly) on the positive side of the spectrum. Given such disparate responses, it is difficult to justify calculating a pride in country score for "Spain" and comparing "Spain" with the other countries in the World Values Survey.
Let us focus on the seven formerly communist countries. For convenience, we have placed these countries toward the bottom of the figure. At the time of the surveys, although the Soviet bloc had crumbled in Central/Eastern Europe, the Baltic states remained republics within the Soviet Union, even though when the surveys were conducted in the summer and fall of 1990 the Baltic republics had already been through a three-year period of very high political mobilization; furthermore, in Spring 1990 they had already held their first competitive parliamentary elections since the 1930s.
In Czechoslovakia, we find low (i.e., negative) pride in country by residents in both the Czech and Slovak regions, with respondents from the former region expressing less pride than those from the latter. In Bulgaria, pride in country among Turks and Gypsies is very low (exceeded in its negativism only by the Basques in Spain).
The three Baltic countries show similar patterns to one another: the titular nationalities all display positive pride in country, with Latvians being among the highest on this measure of any ethnic group in the WVS surveys; at the same time, the largest minority groups, Russians in Estonia and Latvia, and Russians and Poles in Lithuania, are moderately to strongly negative in pride in country. In light of these results, what is the level of pride in country in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Such a countrywide aggregate score is meaningless in those countries because it requires averaging together highly divergent evaluations by the major ethnic groups. [ Figure 5 about here]
When we focus again on the communist and former communist countries, we find that the police receive a negative evaluation by all ethnic groups (relative to the average evaluation of the police given by all respondents to the 1990-1993 WVS). But in each of the Baltic States the titular nationality is more antipathetic toward the police than are the Russians. During the time of the survey, the police (militia) guarded the established political order and were viewed by highly politically mobilized members of the titular na tionalities as blocking their achievement of independence. At the time of the surveys, the police had not yet been reformed into locally controlled forces led by the titular nationalities of the republics. Yet the Russians did not have great confidence in the police either.
Thus, in the Baltic States in 1990, we find very different orientations toward the established order by the titular na tionalities and the Russians. Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians could declare that they were proud to be Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian while having a very negative attitude toward the Soviet-dominated police (results for the armed forces are similar). At the same time, as shown in Figure 6 , the Baltic peoples could express confidence in their newly elected (albeit transitional and still "Soviet") parliaments, while the Russians had a negative or at best a neutral attitude toward these bodies.
[ Figure 6 about here]
The evidence suggests the critical importance of identifying the ethnic group to which the respondent belongs if one hopes to evaluate the degree of confidence in political institutions. Furthermore, it is essential to recognize, especially in periods of great institutional transition, that evaluations of institutions are likely to be sensitive to the perceived roles of those institutions in promoting or obstructing the interests of different ethnic groups. States in ethnically divided societies but with an ethnonational agenda are likely to alienate members of the non-titular or non-eponymous ethnic groups. A change in the ethnic characteristics of the political leadership is likely to lead to sharp changes in the popular evaluations of these institutions. 13 13 For an illustration how sharply the evaluations of political institutions reversed among Russians and Estonians between 1990 and 1997, see Silver and Titma (1998) .
POLITICAL INTEREST AND SUBJECTIVE CIVIC COMPETENCE
We have shown that ethnic groups often differ greatly in their orientation toward the political system and its leading institutions. Perhaps such a test for ethnic differences is too easy, however.
If we were to find any ethnic differences in political culture we would expect to find them on questions such as these, which involve loyalty, political identity, and group interests. Let us now examine value orientations of a different kind, those that deal mainly with political mobilization and efficacy: political interest and subjective political competence.
Figure 7 depicts differences in interest in politics between ethnic groups in 16 WVS societies in 1990-1993. In addition to the large variance on this measure, the most remarkable result is that levels of political interest tend to be consistent between ethnic groups across societies: if members of one ethnic group manifest high interest in politics, so do members of the other ethnic groups; if one ethnic group manifests low interest in politics, so do other groups in the same society. This suggests that political mobilization is driven more by systemic factors or specific events and situations that spark the political engagement of different ethnic groups. The extremely high mobilization of both Czechia and Slovakia is notable but not surprising given that Czechoslovakia was then on the verge of division into two countries (on January 1, 1993).
[ Figure 7 about here] Figure 8 depicts the level of subjective political competence of the survey respondents. To measure subjective competence, the World Values Surveys adapted a question from Almond and Verba (1965) : "If an unjust law were passed by the government, I could do nothing at all about it" (with five ranked response categories on an agree-disagree dimension). For the analysis, we reverse the direction of the scoring so that persons who disagree with the statement are counted as politically competent.
In Figure 8 , we notice a tendency for the means of ethnic groups within a given society to be consistent: if one group has a positive level of subjective competence, so do the others. But the disparities between groups are usually very large. For example, blacks in the United States were much less likely than whites to feel subjectively competent. Similarly, Francophones in Canada were much less likely to feel capable of changing an unjust law than Anglophones, while the two ethnic groups differed only slightly in political interest. Indians in Mexico similarly were much less likely to feel politically competent than persons who claim to be of Spanish origin, even though they are almost as interested in politics as persons of Spanish origin.
[Figure 8 about here]
In Bulgaria as well as in the three Baltic States, minority groups were extremely unlikely to regard themselves as able to change an unjust law. (But in those countries the subjective competence of the majority ethnic groups was also low by world standards.) We would surmise that orientations such as subjective political competence are strongly influenced by the real possibilities for effective political action and are driven only partly by personal characteristics and resources. The subjective political competence indicator shows that oppressed or excluded minorities, in particular, are less likely to be politically competent than are majority ethnic groups. This sensitivity is akin to that which we observed on the measures of pride in country and confidence in major political institutions.
One conclusion is obvious: subjective political competence goes only partly with the territory; it goes much more with the ethnic group. In ethnically divided societies, calculating a "subjective competence score" for the population as a whole overlooks ethnicity as a critical source of variance. In the world at large, people and ethnic groups differ markedly in their levels of political interest, interpersonal trust, subjective political competence, pride in country, and confidence in political institutions, even when adjusting for compositional differences. They thus differ markedly in their adoption of a political culture of democracy.
CONCLUSION
The World Values Survey is a rich resource for making cross-national comparisons of political values. We are thankful to the researchers and organizations in many countries who contributed to the common pool of data. In examining these data, however, we started from the premise that "All data are guilty until proven innocent." 14 Too many researchers have presumed these data to be innocent when using them in comparative analysis. Virtually no researcher has considered the threats to comparability that come from differences in the quality and representativeness of the samples. 15 Moreover, despite the lively debates about the meaning and measurement of political culture, virtually all researchers using the World Values Survey data have adopted the cardinal assumption that the countries are culturally homogeneous, and they have sought to advance or to debunk research on political culture without giving serious attention to cultural differences within societies associated with ethnicity.
Our main goal has been to remind comparative researchers of the potentially large magnitude and impact of ethnic differences in political values within countries. Our reanalysis of World Values Survey data illustrates the value of bringing ethnicity into the study of political culture. A ranking of the world's ethnic groups on key indicators of democratic political culture provides a very different picture from a ranking of world societies, many of which are ethnically diverse. We have demonstrated that country scores are often a composite of sharply different scores for ethnic groups. Ethnic groups within countries are often so divergent in values as to call into question the appropriateness of calculating country scores.
We were also able to highlight important differences in the sensitivity of indicators of democratic political culture to the ethnic factor. Some indicators, such as pride in country, confidence in political institutions, and subjective political competence, are very sensitive to the ethnicity of the respondents. On such indicators, attitudes are often polarized along ethnic lines within ethnically divided societies. Other indicators, such as the level of political interest, while sensitive to withincountry differences, also appear to be affected by the structure of political institutions or by historical events, such as mobilization during political crises. Thus without passing judgment on the mutability of ethnic attachments, we suggest that researchers ought to pay much greater attention to how democratic values are filtered through or interact with ethnic identifications within countries.
APPENDIX Survey Questions and SPSS Commands for Construction of Key Indicators
All variables have been recoded to allow "highest" score to represent "more democratic" values. On request, the authors will also provide an SPSS syntax file defining the ethnicity categories. In the data set there are no missing data for V228 and V233, apparently because both "no mention" and "no answer" were coded as 0 instead of missing. There is no way to distinguish between no mention and missing in the available data. Hence all the above missing data assignments on these variables and their derivatives are actually unnecessary. IF((MISSING(V1040)) AND (MISSING(V1041))) V1042=9. MISSING VALUES V1042 (9). *COMPUTE SECOND PART AND ACHIEVE1 (HARDWORK VERSION In V82, the Slovenian survey and the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian surveys asked about "Gypsies" rather than "Hindus."
The surveys in the Baltic countries asked about "extremists" (not "Left-wing extremists") in V71, and about "people of other nationalities" in V73. 
INTEREST IN POLITICS:
V 241 "How interested would you say you are in politics?" 1) Very interested 2) Somewhat interested 3) Not very interested 4) Not at all interested 9) Don't know
The Swiss survey asked about interest in international politics, national politics, regional politics and community politics.
Responses to the question about community politics (which showed the highest levels of interest) were used here. MISSING VALUES V338 ( ). COMPUTE UNJUST=V338. VARIABLE LABELS UNJUST "COULD DO NOTH ABT UNJST GOV LAW? 5-PT SC, HI=DISAG/COMPET". VALUE LABELS UNJUST 1 "AGR COMPL" 2 "AGR SOMEW" 3 "NEITHER" 4 "DISAGR SOMEW" 5 "DISAGR COMPL" 9 "DK". MISSING VALUES UNJUST (0,9).
MISSING VALUES V241 (

CONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS:
"Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH ITEM. READ OUT REVERSING ORDER FOR ALTERNATE CONTACTS." 
